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A LOOK AT THE CAUSES, IMPACT AND FUTURE OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
By: Scott Green*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The agents and gatekeepers of our public companies serve an important
role in the capitalist system. At the most basic level, they are the appointed
guardians of a stockholder's invested capital. The agents are our boards of
directors and executive management of our public companies and the
gatekeepers are the regulators, accountants, lawyers, and even the financial
analysts whose opinions we rely on when investing capital.
The near
simultaneous implosion of Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing and Adelphia
Communications together with the management hijinks at Tyco, HealthSouth
and Imclone, among others, led to a public crisis of confidence in our nation's
financial markets in 2001 and 2002.
The vast majority of agents and
gatekeepers are honest, hard working people who want to do the right thing.
However, this tsunami of corruption threatened to sweep up the good with the
bad in its destructive path. By the summer of 2002, restoring public confidence
in our markets became paramount.
Congress responded to this crisis by passing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
("SOX" or "the Act") of 2002. The impact of this legislation was significant
and immediate. A survey released in March 2003 by PricewaterhouseCoopers
(PWC) found that the Act had already resulted in changes to auditing controls
and compliance at 84% of United States multi-national corporations.' The Act
expanded the regulatory oversight and guidance for auditors, lawyers, and
analysts as well as addressed many of the structural corporate reforms necessary
through interpreting rules issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") and a new set of listing standards by the New York Stock Exchange
("NYSE") and the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD"). As is
common with legislation impacting the financial markets, the Act provides an
overall framework for regulating the markets, while leaving detailed oversight to
the SEC. The SEC in turn allows the self-regulatory organizations (NYSE and

*Scott Green, CPA, is the Global Head of Audit and Compliance for Weil, Gotshal & Manges, one
of the largest law firms in the world and a leader in the practice of corporate governance. A graduate
of the Harvard Business School, he is a recognized expert on management controls with more than
fifteen years of experience in the field and author of the book, Manager'sGuide to the SarbanesOxley Act: Improving InternalControls to Prevent Fraud(February 2004). He has also taught
finance and banking at Hofstra University's Frank G.Zarb School of Business.
'PricewaterhouseCoopers' Management Barometer, Sarbanes-Oxley Act Requires Changes in
CorporateControl,Compliance,According to PricewaterhouseCoopersSurvey of Senior
Executives, (Mar. 24, 2003), at http://www.barometersurveys.com.
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NASD) to draft and implement detailed rules that address the requirements of
the Act as well as SEC requirements.
This article will review the more significant roles which certain agents
and gatekeepers played in contributing to the crisis of confidence leading up to
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and how the Act addressed these actions. Specifically,
the article will examine the Act's response to related party transactions, financial
reporting management, excessive executive compensation, executive stock
trading, and poor culture that led to the current crisis as well as to the failings of
our auditors, lawyers and analysts as gatekeepers. The article will also briefly
evaluate the limitations of the Act going forward. Additionally, it will examine
the Act's impact on international companies and foreign governments. Finally,
this article will analyze potential future consequences of the Act along with
providing recommendations on its implementation.
II. RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS AT ENRON AND
ADELPHIA COMMUNICATIONS
As defined in the Act, a "conflict of interest occurs when an
individual's private interest interferes in any way- or even appears to interferewith the interests of the corporation as a whole." 2 Such arrangements might
benefit the company and may not be detrimental per se. Where conflicts arise,
they must be well communicated, managed, and subjected to detailed and
unimpeachable oversight to ensure that stockholders benefit from doing business
with the related party. This is easier said than done. Related-party transactions
are numerous and widespread. A recent survey conducted by the Wall Street
Journal that evaluated over four hundred of the nation's largest public
companies revealed that "some 300 of those companies reported one or more
related party transactions ... many of these transactions involved millions of
dollars."3
At Enron, Andrew Fastow, the Chief Financial Officer (the "CFO"),
managed the creation of off-balance sheet entities with the effect of creating an
unrealistic picture of financial health for the company. In certain instances, the
CFO was also responsible for managing the off-balance sheet vehicles in which
he had a financial interest. This insider dealing resulted in the collapse of one of
the world's largest corporations. An investigation by Enron's Board of
Directors found:
These partnerships . . . were used by Enron
management to enter into transactions that it
could not, or would not, do with unrelated
commercial entities. Many of the most
2 Final NYSE Corporate Governance Rules, NYSE's LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A. 10 (Nov.

4,2003), available at www.NYSE.com/pdfs/finalcorpgovrules.pdf.
3 John R. Emshwiller, Business Ties: Many Companies Report Transactions With Top Officers,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 2003, at Al.
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significant transactions apparently were designed
to accomplish favorable financial statement
results, not to achieve bona fide economic
objectives or to transfer risk.
-Excerpt from the Report of Investigation 4by the Board of
Directors of Enron Corporation (Powers Report)
In 1997, the CFO began creating Special Purpose Entities ("SPEs") to
hold assets and provide the appearance of creating legitimate financing
transactions. SPEs can be very effective financing and risk management
vehicles if used properly. A parent company's debt level or other risk factors
can hinder the capability of a strong business segment to obtain favorable
interest rates to finance its operations. In such a situation, the parent can create
an SPE and transfer the asset to it with the goal of receiving more favorable
lending rates. As long as there is another independent third party investor that
has contributed at least 3% of the assets and an independent party controls the
entity, the SPE does not have to be consolidated into the parent for financial
reporting purposes. 5 Furthermore, if the assets in the SPE are of high quality,
banks will lend to the entity at lower lending rates than could be received by the
originating company. The SPE will then use this money to pay the parent for
the asset received. The bottom line is that the company obtains the money it
requires, but pays less to obtain it than would otherwise be the case.
However, Enron ran out of quality assets to transfer, so inferior assets
were reassigned and Enron stock pledged as a guarantee of payment to the
banks. And who did Enron find to be that 3% investor in the SPEs? The CFO,
through a partnership called LJM, among others.6 But why would he want to
invest in poor quality assets? Because the fees Enron paid LJM for managing up
the transaction eliminated his risk in these vehicles. He effectively cashed out;
so while he was an investor on paper, he really had no downside risk.7
Enron's Board contained a former accounting professor, the former
executives of an insurance company and a bank, the former head of the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission and a hedge fund manager.8
Enron's financial transactions were confusing even to this highly
knowledgeable Board. What was clear is that the Board did waive their
conflict of interest rules to allow these transactions to take place. The Board's
' William C. Powers, Jr., Raymond S. Troubh, Herbert S. Winokur, Jr., Report of Investigation by
the Special Investigative Committee of the Boardof Directorsof Enron Corp. (Feb 1, 2002), at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/enron/sincreport/. See also ARTHUR L. BERKOWiTZ, ENRON: A
PROFESSIONAL'S GUIDE TO THE EVENTS, ETHICAL ISSUES, AND PROPOSED REFORMS 147 (Diana
Roozeboom et al. eds., CCH Inc. 2002) (providing in its Appendix A an excerpt from the Report of
Investigation by the Special Investigation Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron Corp.
(Powers Report)).
5 BERKOWiTZ, supranote 4, at 148.
6 Id. at 151-52, 156.
7 See SEC v. Fastow (S.D. Tex. 2002), at http://www.sec.gov/Iitigation/complaints/compl 7762.htm.
8 Associated Press, Enron Directorsat a Glance (Sept. 25, 2002), at
http://www.abcnews.go.com/wire/Politics/ap20020925_1857.html.
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responsibility to understand these transactions is paramount where related
parties are involved. They must ensure that the transactions are in the best
interests of the company and its shareholders.
Enron was not the only company that had material related party
transactions that brought down the company. Conflicts of interest can be
among the most damaging control weaknesses absorbed by a company,
particularly if they occur between the company and its founder. The Rigas
family allegedly borrowed more than $3 billion using the assets of Adelphia
Communications, a company they founded. 9 Additionally, the company
created a Rigas-run investment firm, helped purchase the National Hockey
League's (NHL's) Buffalo Sabres and built a golf course on Rigas-owned
land. To compound matters, the Rigas debt was not presented or disclosed in
Adelphia's financial statements, which would have produced a markedly
different picture of financial health.
The new listing rules of the NYSE require companies to adopt and
disclose a code of business conduct and ethics for directors, officers, and
employees, and promptly disclose any waivers of the code for directors or
executive officers. The code must include, among other things, policies
regarding conflicts of interest and corporate opportunities. The company should
also have a policy prohibiting conflicts and provide a means for communication
of potential conflicts to the board.'
Furthermore, "Employees, officers and directors should be prohibited
from (a) taking for themselves personally opportunities that are discovered
through the use of corporate property, information or position; (b) using
corporate property, information, or position for personal gain; and (c) competing
with the company."" Given the number of related party transactions currently
in place, a tremendous amount of work must be done to replace services or
otherwise implement oversight controls for our largest public companies.
Additionally, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act specifically addressed offbalance sheet transactions such as the SPEs used at Enron. The Act directed the
SEC to provide rules requiring the issuer to "disclose all material off-balance
sheet transactions, arrangements, obligations (including contingent obligations),
and other relationships of the issuer with unconsolidated entities or persons."12
I1.

FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING AT WORLDCOM

While Enron was arguably the primary driver leading to the creation of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, WorldCom was by far the largest single bankruptcy in
history 13 and significantly impacted the final legislation.
According to
Congressman Michael G. Oxley, one of the bill's sponsors, "WorldCom took all
the oxygen out of the room because it was so huge- four or five times larger in
9 Leigh Gallagher, What Did They Know?, FORBES, May 26,2003, at 53.

10See Final NYSE Corporate Governance Rules, supra note 2.
" Id.

12 Sarbanes-Oxley
13See

Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 107 H.R. 3763, § 4010) (2002).
Bamaby Feder, CourtApproves WorldCom Plan,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1,2003, at C3.
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bankruptcy terms than Enron. It really did change the debate, particularly in the
Senate."' 4 The company experienced so many lapses in accepted governance
practices that the size and complexity of the company's collapse alone provides
a study in how poor culture, control systems, and oversight can easily lead a
company to ruin. The reported financial condition of the company was
manipulated by management to such an extent that, what appeared to be a
profitable company was, in reality, bankrupt. Despite over $100 billion in
assets, the company filed for Chapter 11 protection in early 2002.15 By
November of that year, the company admitted that it had overstated profits by $96
billion between 1999 and early 2002, and possibly by as much as $11 billion.'
The inflated profits were largely due to operating expenses that WorldCom had
capitalized. Instead of recognizing expenses when they were due, the company
recorded them as assets, delaying their recognition as expenses17 to a future date.
But the company also manipulated reserves to offset expenses.
While Scott Sullivan, WorldCom's former CFO, appeared to be the
individual directing the management of the financial statements, according to
Dick Thornburgh, the bankruptcy court examiner, the Board did little to
question management about its merger and acquisition activity, and "the
company's burgeoning debt load."' 8 In addition, with the Board "placing
virtually no checks or restraints" on management, the Directors did little to
question nor did they seemingly understand the ramifications of giving
management the "authority to borrow an unlimited amount of money without
seeking the Directors' approval."' 19 The WorldCom Board also authorized the
company to make or guarantee over $400 million in loans to their Chief
Executive Officer (the "CEO"), Bernard Ebbers, without proper evaluation
regarding whether he could repay them.2 °
In this short case, we have examples of fraudulent financial reporting,
imprudent loans to management, and a lack of adequate oversight by the Board
of Directors that undoubtedly impacted the thinking of lawmakers and regulators
drafting new legislation and implementing rules. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, SEC
rules, and NYSE and NASD listing requirements address these issues by:

14House Committee on Financial Services, Rebuilding Investor Confidence, ProtectingU.S. Capital
Markets, House Comm. on Financial Services, 107th Cong. Report on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act H.R.
3763 (Comm. Print 2002) at http://www.financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/SarbanesOxley%2OReport.pdf, at 2 (last visited at March 9, 2004).
15See Feder, supra note 13.
16Bamaby Feder, ManagementPracticeEnabled Huge Fraud,2 InvestigationsFind,N.Y. TIMEs,

June
10, 2003, at C1.
7
1 id.
1 Floyd Norris, Ebbers and PassiveDirectorsBlamedfor WorldCom Woes, N.Y. TIMES, June 10,
2003, at C I (quoting Dick Thomburgh).
19Id.
20Richard C. Breeden, Restoring Trust: Report to The Hon. Jed S. Rakoff, The UnitedStates District
Court For the SouthernDistrictofNew York, On Corporate GovernanceFor The Future of MCI,
Inc., (Aug., 2003), at 2.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2004

5

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 2

*

*
*

*

Requiring the principal executive officer and principal financial officer
statements with fines and
to personally certify their financial
21
incarceration as enforcement tools.
22
Precluding the board from awarding loans to executives
Requiring the creation of a written charter, not only for the board, but
also for their governance, compensation and audit committees and
annual performance evaluations against these charters.23
Requiring independent directors to meet regularly in executive session
without the company's management present.24

Principal executive and financial officers must produce a section 302
certification to file with their annual financial statements. These officers certify
that they are responsible for internal controls over financial reporting and, to the
best of their knowledge, that the financial statements are accurate. Penalties for
knowingly filing false financial statements include fines of up to $5 million and
twenty years in jail. 25
The implementing rules of the SEC also preclude boards from
awarding preferential loans to their officers. Section 402 of SOX makes it
unlawful for a company to "directly or indirectly, including through any
subsidiary, extend or maintain credit, arrange for the extension of credit, or
renew an extension of credit, in the form of a personal loan to or for any
26
director or executive officer (or equivalent thereof) of that issuer."
Additionally, the listing rules of the NYSE and the NASD now require the
and
existence of a fully independent audit committee that has a defined charter
27
annual self-evaluation process so an evaluation of diligence is present.
IV. COMPENSATION AT TYCO
Executive compensation is one of the most contentious issues a
board can face. The interests of the shareholders must be weighed against the
Even where a
compensation requirements of its executive team.
compensation plan is derived at by a deliberate and prudent process, the
amounts can be perceived as unfair by rank and file employees and
shareholders. Where there is no deliberate process, wholesale looting of the
company can occur. According to an indictment filed by New York State,
Tyco's Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Dennis Kozlowski is
accused of running a sophisticated criminal enterprise-so sophisticated, in

21 Sarbanes-Oxley

Act of 2002, supra note 12, at § 302.

22Id at § 402(a)(kX1).
23See Final NYSE Corporate Governance Rules, supra note 2, at § 303A.4(a)-(bXii), § 303A.5(a)-

(bXii), § 303A.6, § 303A.7(cXii).
24 See id. at § 303A.3
25House Committee on Financial Services, supra note 14, at 5.
226
7Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, supra note 22.
Id.at § 301.
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fact, that prosecutors named it "Top Executives Criminal Enterprise," 28 which
they used to describe Kozlowski's management team throughout the
indictment. Kozlowski stands accused of thirty-eight felony counts of
stealing $170 million directly, and $430 million indirectly through illicit stock
sales. Some of the other excesses the State accused Kozlowski of include:
"

"
"
*
*
*

Deciding what bonuses would be paid to whom, and when, without
regard to restrictions that the board placed on executive
compensation.
Hiding unauthorized bonuses in transactions booked as
"nonrecurring charges."
Using the company treasury to pay his personal bills.
Publicly supporting Tyco stock while privately selling it.
Using corporate money to purchase directors' residences at greatly
inflated prices.
Selling corporate residences to himself at far less than fair value. 29

The SEC piled on the offenses by including in its complaint that Kozlowski:
*
*
*
*

Used $7 million of Tyco's funds to purchase a Park Avenue
apartment for his first wife, from whom he was separated.
Forgave tens of millions of dollars in loans to executives and
directors, including himself.
Accelerated the vesting of Tyco stock for himself and others.
Used corporate money to buy his New Hampshire house for three
times its apparent fair market value.

Kozlowski excesses began in 1997 with the purchase of the security
firm ADT. The purchase enabled him to further his hold on the board. The
officers and directors of ADT were no strangers to generous compensation
packages. The Chairman kept his headquarters in Bermuda and used his yacht
as a floating executive suite. Kozlowski appointed two of ADT's directors to
the four-man compensation committee, which quickly adopted ADT's more
generous compensation schemes.
Under the plan, Kozlowski's total
compensation rocketed from $8.8 million in 1997 to $170 million in 1999.
Still it was not enough. During this period, Kozlowski allegedly
utilized his relocation accounts and an employee corporate loan program- a
program designed to help employees pay taxes due on stock granted under a
Tyco stock ownership plan- to buy homes, artwork, jewelry and a 1930's
vintage yacht. He is also accused of using the accounts to reward favored
executives, provide huge charitable gifts in his name and throw extravagant
parties.

28Indictment for The People of the State of New York, New York v. Kozlowski, (No. 5259/02).
29 Id.
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The excesses did not stop there, either. Kozlowski owned houses in
the posh districts of Greenwich, Connecticut; Boca Raton, Florida; Nantucket,
Massachusetts; New York City; and Beaver Creek, Colorado. 30 Why a
person legitimately making $170 million in a single year would put it all on
the line by embezzling from his company is one for the psychoanalysts.
Regardless, these events did lead the NYSE to include in its listing rules the
following requirements:
*
*

"
•

The company must have a compensation committee comprised
entirely of independent directors.
The compensation committee must have a written charter detailing
its purpose and responsibilities which include, at a minimum, the
review and approval of corporate goals and objectives relevant to
CEO compensation and evaluation of performance and determine as
a committee, or together with the board, the CEO's compensation
based on that evaluation. The committee will also make
recommendations with respect to non-CEO compensation.
The compensation committee must prepare a committee report on
executive compensation to be filed with the SEC on form 10-K.
The committee must perform an annual self evaluation of
performance against their charter.3

The lack of independence on the compensation committee was not the
only conflict of interest on Tyco's Board. Another director, Frank Walsh, was
paid $10 million and another $10 million was paid to his charity for consulting
work he performed for the company arranging an acquisition. So despite
originally being independent, his independence was compromised when he
began consulting for the company. To address this, the NYSE listing
requirements also defines what constitutes director independence and requires
the entire board to evaluate the independence of each of its members: "No
director qualifies as "independent" unless the board of directors affirmatively
determines that the director has no material relationship with the listed company
(either directly or as a partner, shareholder, or officer of an organization that has
a relationship with the company).
Companies must disclose these
determinations. 32
New York Stock Exchange rules extend this definition for a period of
three years after the end of the relationship that disqualifies independence to
both the individual in question as well as to their immediate family members.
A director or family member that receives more than $100,000 a year in direct
compensation or is an executive officer of another company doing more than

30Complaint for SEC, SEC v. Kozlowski, (S.D.N.Y. 2002), at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/complr17722.htm.
31See Final NYSE Corporate Governance Rules, supra note 2, at § 303A.4(b)(ii), § 303A.5(b)(ii), §
303A.7(c)(ii).
2 See id.at § 303A.2(a).
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$1 million or 2% of that company's consolidated gross revenues with the
company also precludes independence. 3
V. EXECUTIVE STOCK TRADING AT IMCLONE AND ENRON
There is not a more treasonous act to an agency relationship than that
of a company executive using inside information to trade ahead of his or her
stockholders. Imclone's former CEO, Sam Waksal, was convicted for acting
on insider information. He not only sold his stock just prior to public
notification of the FDA's rejection of Imclone's cancer drug Erbitux, but also
tipped off family members. The revelations forced the resignations of senior
executives and continue to weigh heavily on the company at a time when it
should be concentrating its efforts on correcting its application and getting its
drug approved. Waksal was eventually sentenced to seven-plus years in
prison for his actions.34
While Waksal broke existing securities laws, director, officer and
principal stockholder disclosures were nevertheless tightened under the Act.
Disclosures not only include transactions in equities, but swap agreements as
well with requirements for electronic filings to a publicly available website. If
the company maintains a website, they must also post this disclosure the day
after filing. Furthermore, if an issuer is required to prepare an accounting
restatement due to material non-compliance of the issuer, as a result of
misconduct, with any financial reporting requirement, any profits realized from
the sale of securities of the issuer during that twelve month period must be
forfeited.
The growth in defined contribution or 401k pension plans has been well
documented. It has not been unusual for a large percentage of a defined
contribution plan's assets to be comprised of company stock. The company
encourages, or even requires a portion of plan assets consist of company stock to
keep it in stable hands. At Enron, company stock accounted for 62% of assets in
the employee's 401k plan at the end of 2000.35 What was unusual, however,
was that employees at Enron were prevented from selling their company stock
while it imploded due to a company directed "black-out period." "Black-outperiods" can be legitimately instituted to change administrators, add or remove
funds, close the books or other plan events. During Enron's black-out, however,
executives freely sold their company awarded stock while rank and file
employees had their investments in company stock frozen via their 401 k plan.
To prevent similar conflicts, Section 306 of the Act prohibits insiders
from trading during pension blackout periods. Specifically, "it shall be unlawful
for any director or executive officer of an issuer of any equity security ....
directly or indirectly, to purchase, sell or otherwise acquire or transfer any
3"See id. at § 303A.2(bXii).
34Constance L. Hayes, FormerChiefof Imclone is Given 7-year Term, N.Y. TIMEs, June 11, 2003 at

CI.

35David M. Katz, The Lay Deed or the Tiger, CFO.COM (Feb. 15, 2002), at
http://www.cfo.com/Article?article=6718.
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equity security of the issuer... during any blackout period with respect to such
equity security if such director or officer acquires such equity security in
with his or her service or employment as a director or executive
connection
36
officer."
VI. THE CULTURE AT HEALTHSOUTH
It is hard to put a price tag on a strong, open and honest corporate
culture, but easier to associate a cost to a company of a closed, fraudulent
culture with an imperial CEO. The Justice Department has charged Richard
Scrushy, the former CEO of HealthSouth, with an eighty-five count
indictment which includes conspiracy, mail, wire and securities fraud; false
statements; false certifications; and money laundering. Investors have
punished the stock of the nation's largest chain of rehabilitation hospitals,
pushing it down over 75% since these issues were raised. Fifteen insiders
have pled guilty to a number of charges of financial wrongdoing at the
company intended to mislead the financial community. Eleven of these
insiders who have been cooperating with investigators describe a culture in
which board minutes were altered, board members investigated by the
company's security chief, and employee fear of reporting fraudulent activities,
or even bad news to management. Corporate counsel tells how he delayed
giving bad news to the CEO because he knew it would make him unhappy.
An accountant who did report suspected fraud was later passed over for
promotion. One supervisor went so far as to convince a physical therapist to
drop his plans to report his suspicions to the company's fraud hotline. 7
Those who would flout the laws of our country will reward those that
sustain them, and punish those that they perceive as a threat. In order for
corporate governance systems to work effectively, there must be a strong
culture which rewards doing the right thing and provides an effective means
for reporting bad behavior. Employees must trust that whistle blowing will
not lead to punitive measures against them, rather that their courage will be
embraced. To help put these conditions in place, the SEC is implementing
rules which require each company to construct a code of ethics for senior
financial officers. The audit committee of the board of directors must also
establish procedures for the confidential, anonymous submission by
employees of concerns regarding questionable accounting or auditing matters.
Furthermore, Section 806 of SOX puts in place important protections
for employees of publicly traded companies that provide evidence of fraud.
The act prohibits actions to "discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass or in
any other manner discriminate against an employee . . . because of a lawful

36Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, supra note 12, at § 306(aX 1).
37Milt Freudenheim, Former ChiefofHealthSouth Refuses to Respond at Hearing,N.Y. TIMEs, Oct.
17, 2003, at CI.
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act done by the employee
compensatory damages.

38

and provides remedies in the form of

VII. OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE AT ARTHUR ANDERSEN
While the poor judgment and professionalism of Andersen's
assessment of Enron and WorldCom's financial statements is what stands out in
the minds of managers, regulators, and the press, Andersen was actually undone
by being found guilty of obstructing justice. In an indictment filed in the United
States District Court, Southern District of Texas, the government accused
Andersen of the wholesale destruction of documents germane to the Enron case
with the intent to "alter, destroy, mutilate and conceal objects with intent to
impair the objects, integrity and availability for use in such official
proceedings., 39 Found guilty, Andersen was forced to disband and over one
thousand of their clients had to fimd new auditors.4 °
Interestingly, the indictment did spell out some of Andersen's
shortcomings regarding their work on Enron's financial statements. These
include:
"

*

*
*

Andersen did not object or otherwise cure public statements by Enron
incorrectly characterizing numerous charges as non-recurring, even
though Andersen believed the company did not have a basis for this
conclusion.
The Andersen team handling the Enron audit contravened the
accounting methodology approved by Andersen's own specialist
working in its Professional Standards Group.
Internal reviews of the Andersen team assigned to Enron received a
rating of "2" on a five point scale with "5" being the highest.
Andersen had direct knowledge of allegations of financial reporting
fraud made by Sherron Watkins, the famous Enron whistleblower.'

So it is clear that, despite the indictment made concerning obstruction of justice,
the government believed that there were deficiencies in Andersen's capabilities
as independent auditor of Enron.
Enron was one of Andersen's largest clients, reportedly the source for
$25 million in annual audit fees and $27 million in consulting and other fees.42
Andersen also performed the role of internal auditor for a period of time which
38Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, supra note 12, at § 806.
39US v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, Criminal Action No. H-02-121, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26870, at

* 15-16 (S.D. Texas May 24, 2002) (quoting T. 18, U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2)(B)).
40Lee Berton, GAO Says Big 4 'Oligopoly'CanHamper Business (Nov. 21, 2003), available at

http:l
quote.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000039&sid=aT2wnFt98bjA&refer-colunmistberton
visited Mar. 10, 2004).
41See Andersen, supranote 39.
42BERKOWITZ, supra note 4, at 9.
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creates the appearance of a conflict of interest. 4 How can the independent
auditors opine on their own work? The answer is they can not.
To address the professional standards of the independent auditors
apparently absent at Enron and others, Congress established the new Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board ("PCAOB") under SOX to regulate the
accounting profession and "to oversee the audit of public companies that are
subject to the securities laws and related matters." 44 It has been charged with the
awesome responsibility of setting ethical and conflict-of-interest standards,
disciplining accountants and conducting annual reviews of the largest
accounting firms. In short, the Board now has regulatory oversight of the
accounting profession and has taken over many functions that were previously
self-regulated with oversight from the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Andersen's legacy is the end of the profession's self regulation.
The Act further requires that partners only serve a client for five years
at which time they must rotate off. Additionally, the Act prohibits a registered
public accounting firm who is providing audit services to contemporaneously
provide non-audit services such as bookkeeping, systems design and
implementation, appraisal or valuation services, fairness opinions and
contribution in kind reports, actuarial services, internal audit outsourcing
services, management or human resource functions, broker/dealer, investment
advisory or investment banking services, or legal and expert services unrelated
to the audit.45 Other services, including tax services, are allowed with the
approval of the audit committee of the board of directors.46
VIII. CONFLICT OF INTEREST AT VINSON & ELKINS
As one of the oldest and most prestigious law firms in Houston, the
firm of Vinson & Elkins was a trusted advisor to Enron and was paid
handsomely. Enron paid the law firm $36 million in 2001, representing roughly
7% of their global revenue.47 In response to the Sherron Watkins memo
detailing concerns about the special purpose entities, Enron retained Vinson &
Elkins to investigate the allegations even though Watkins had specifically
written that they should not be selected for examining these transactions due to
the obvious conflicts of interest.
Good investigators leave no stone unturned. They need to be
independent, objective and have a heavy dose of professional skepticism while
performing their inquiry. Having worked on a number of transactions for the
company, and having a long, profitable relationship with its management, it
would have been difficult for the best intentioned lawyers to remain objective
and diligent. Predictably, the firm's investigation was ineffective. In the report,
Vinson & Elkins said that the issues raised "do not, in our judgment, warrant a
43id.
44Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, supra note 12, at § 10 1(a).
41Id.at § 201(g)(1)-(9).
46Id.at § 201(h).
47BERKOWITZ, supranote 4, at 12.
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further widespread investigation by independent counsel and auditors. '48 The
eventual bankruptcy of Enron puts this opinion in a particularly harsh light.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act allows the SEC to establish professional
standards of conduct for the nation's attorneys. These standards include "up the
ladder" reporting obligations that would be triggered when an attorney
"becomes aware of evidence of a material violation by the issuer or by any
officer, director, employee or agent of the issuer."49 The lawyer would then
have to report the matter to the chief legal counsel of the company. If the
attorney does not receive an adequate response from the company's chief legal
counsel and the CEO, the lawyer must report the violation to the company's
board of directors, the audit committee of the board, or a committee consisting
of outside directors. That is where the lawyer's duties currently end. These
actions protect the lawyer from disciplinary action and civil liability.
IX.

ANALYST INDEPENDENCE AT INVESTMENT BANKS

Investors often rely on research conducted by analysts affiliated with
broker/dealers. These analysts are represented to be independent of a bank's
investment banking and trading operations. However, the pressure to issue
positive research for those companies with which the bank has a relationship can
be intense as there are millions of dollars in commissions and fees at stake. At
times, the ties between a company and a bank can be so strong, that research
analysts are awarded unprecedented access and favored treatment which
presumably would be cut off if an unfavorable research report were issued.
The House Committee on Financial Oversight reviewed the ties
between Jack Grubman, an analyst for Salomon Smith Barney, and WorldCom's
CEO Bernie Ebbers and CFO Scott Sullivan. They found "a lack of
independence" with Grubman attending "company board meetings, exclusive of
other analysts., 50 By providing Grubman with access to information not
available to other analysts, the company hoped to color his analysis in their
favor. Investors who relied on Grubman's "independent and objective research"
would be disappointed as WorldCom collapsed.
Henry Blodget, the senior research analyst and group head for the
Internet sector at Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith was permanently
barred from the securities industry and fined for issuing fraudulent research in
which he expressed views that were inconsistent with his privately expressed
negative views. In short, the Securities and Exchange Commission found that
he issued positive research on GoTo.com while privately disparaging the
company. Blodget also issued research reports on "six other internet companies

' Id.(quoting Vinson & Elkins).
'9SEC Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before the
Commission in the Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. §205.3 (2003).
50House Committee on Financial Services, supra note 14, at 21.
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that were not based on principles of fair dealing and good faith and did not
provide a sound basis for evaluating facts regarding those companies."'I
The Act directed the SEC to implement rules to address "conflicts of
interest that can arise when securities analysts recommend equity securities in
research reports and public appearances, in order to improve the objectivity of
research and provide investors with more useful and reliable information. 52
The Act also prohibits retaliation by a broker/dealer for a negative research
report on a present or prospective investment banking client and requires
safeguards to separate research from investment banking activities.
X. THE ROLE OF SELF REGULATORY ORGANIZATIONS
(SROs)
The nation's two largest stock markets, the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) and the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), are self
regulatory organizations (SROs), meaning that they not only provide a
marketplace for stocks, but they also self-police their members and set listing
requirements for companies that wish to list their securities with them. This is
all done under the supervision of the SEC. After the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley,
the NYSE and NASD embarked on an evaluation of their governance structure
with particular emphasis on the relationship of their regulatory enforcement
efforts to the rest of the organization. There is an inherent conflict between
providing a competitive market and self-regulation which both organizations are
continually analyzing and attempting to address. The NYSE and NASD also
issued new listing requirements that went above and beyond what was required
under the SOX.
Some additional NYSE requirements include:
*
*
•
*
*
*
*

a board that consists of an independent majority
a nominating /corporate governance committee that is composed
entirely of independent directors
a compensation committee that is composed entirely of independent
directors
additional audit committee requirements including the preparation of a
charter and an annual self-evaluation
a requirement that non-management directors regularly meet in
executive session without management
that each company must have an audit department
that each company adopt and disclose corporate governance guidelines
which include director qualification standards, responsibilities,

51Joint Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, The Securities and Exchange
Commission, NASD and the New York Stock Exchange Permanently Bar Henry Blodget From the
Securities Industry and Require $4 Million Payment (April 28, 2003), at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-56.htm.
52Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, supra note 12, at § 501.

46
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*
*

compensation, continuing education, succession, and annual
performance evaluation of the board
the adoption of a code of ethics for directors, officer, and employees
and disclosure of waivers for officers and directors
CEO certification that they are not aware of any violations of the
NYSE corporate governance listing standards

The listing requirements further define "independence" to create bright
line criteria regarding whether a director is and remains independent for the
purpose of meeting corporate governance requirements. NASD listing standards
are similar except that the independence thresholds are lower reflecting the
smaller market capitalization of many of their listings. The NASD rules also do
not require independent compensation or nominating committees, but do require
that a majority of the full board's independent members approve compensation
and nomination proposals.53 While it is too early to determine how these rules
will impact sitting directors, there is little doubt that board independence will be
improved going forward.
XI. THE ACT'S IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL COMPANIES
AND FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS
When SOX was drafted, "many international firms and foreign
governments sought exemptions from the legislation. 54 Despite much concern
and lobbying, no exemptions or accommodations were made for foreign entities
in the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation. Those foreign entities that file 20-Fs with the
SEC instead of the 10-Ks required by domestic public companies must also
certify their financial statements. Additionally, a registered public accounting
firm must audit and attest to management's assertions. The Act specifically
requires that foreign accounting firms register with the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), but the board is negotiating joint
supervision rules with the European Union (the "EU") that would rely on the
oversight of European regulators to conduct reviews of registered accounting
firms in their jurisdiction."
The recent massive fraud at the Italian company Parmalat shows that
Europe is not immune from problems similar to those experienced in the United
States. Using a complicated and layered ownership structure, the company
effectively hid its financial problems from the world for years."
Grant
Thornton, the company's auditors, have been implicated in helping set up and
continue to audit certain companies in question. In the United States, the SEC
has sued Parmalat accusing them of selling "bonds and other securities while
5

3 SCOTT GREEN, MANAGER'S GUIDE TO THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT: IMPROVING INTERNAL

CONTROLS TO PREVENT FRAUD (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2004).

House Committee on Financial Services, supra note 14, at 18.
Daren Fonda, Revenge of the Beancounters,TIME, Mar. 29, 2004, at 38-39.
-6 John Tagliabue, Layers of Ownership Conceal Trouble in Italy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2003, at CI.
-'
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engaging in one of the most brazen corporate financial frauds in history. 57T This
fraud promises to be as complex and global as any before it. Some estimate the
assets of Parmalat to be worth I 5to8 2 billion euros, while debt has been estimated
to be as high as 14 billion euros.
Italy is not the only EU country experiencing corporate abuses. KPMG
Forensic recently reported that the number of big fraud cases in Britain almost
doubled in 2003 to 153 from 83 the previous year.59 Union Bank of Switzerland
(UBS), one of Europe's largest banks, has been implicated in bribery and share
price rigging in Hong Kong. 60 Accounting scandals and irregularities have also
been reported at the Dutch supermarket group Ahold and Zurich-based Adecco,
the largest temporary employment agency in the world. 61
Playing catch-up, the EU has made proposals to improve corporate
governance and audit services throughout the Union. Oversight is currently
conducted on a national level with no uniformity between member states. These
new proposals include improved uniform disclosure requirements, better
director independence, and coordination of the corporate governance efforts of
member states.62 There are also initiatives to join EU and US auditing
standards, establish pan-European auditor ethics, and coordinating national
auditor oversight systems into a pan-European board.63
The effects of the legislation in Asia have been less potent, however, as
Japan has used Enron and other large frauds as an excuse to put off real
corporate governance reform. 64 Not long ago, in a fraud similar to Enron,
Yamaichi Securities used off-balance sheet vehicles to manipulate their
financials resulting in their collapse.65 Furthermore, some believe Japan's
banking sector crises has been a partial result of poor corporate governance and
Despite this evidence that the Japanese
shareholder accountability.6
governance system needs improvement, problems in the US seem to have
retarded reforms aimed at correcting these shortcomings as critics point to the
inability of US style corporate governance to prevent similar fraud.
Clearly, the impact of Sarbanes-Oxley overseas has been significant,
both positive and negative, and promises to continue to drive change throughout
the world.

57Mary Williams Walsh, A US. Component is Added to an ItalianScandal-SEC Sues Parmalat,

Accusing it of Fraud,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2003, at Cl.
8 Fred Kapner, Crisisat ParmalatDeepens as Debt EstimateHits EJ4bn, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan.

22, 2004, at 19.
59Bob Sherwood, Number of Big FraudCases Almost Doubles, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 26, 2004, at

4.
60Keith Bradsher, FinancialScandal Hits HongKong, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2004, at Wl.

61John Plender, Schooled by Scandal: What Auditors and Investors Still Have to Learn From
Europe'sAccounting Debacles, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 21, 2004, at 15.
62House Committee on Financial Services, supranote 14, at 18-19.
63 Id. at 19.
6' John Plender, Tilt in the Balance of Boardroom Power, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 21, 2004, at 8.
65 Id.

6 Id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol3/iss1/2

16

Green: A Look at the Causes, Impact and Future of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act

THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BusINEss & LAW

XI. THE FUTURE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
There is no question that the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation has had a
significant impact on both the operations and regulatory costs of public
companies. If history is any guide, simply passing the Act will not deter fraud
and other criminal activity. Much of the bad behavior detailed above broke
existing laws dating back to 1933 and 1934. Since passage of the Securities Act
of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, we have experienced the S&L
crisis and a series of corporate frauds and other financial shenanigans which
include the collapse of Drexel, Burnham and Lambert and Barings Brothers, the
turmoil and sale of Kidder Peabody and Banker's Trust, and the bankruptcy of
Orange County, California. The penalties may be more stringent, and the
chances of getting caught greater, but it is safe to say that neither Congress nor
the SEC can legislate or regulate individuals into doing the right thing. Like a
single-minded killer, a criminal intent on illegal behavior will not be dissuaded
by laws and regulations. They will search for new ways to circumvent existing
behavioral boundaries and controls. It is not possible to know with certainty the
next iteration of fraud that will be created by these rogues, only that it will
happen.
The questions then become, what will be the response to the next
corporate crises? How many more scandals will the public endure before they
call the capitalist system into question? How much more regulation can our
public companies carry before they fall to foreign competition? The answers to
these questions depend on the type of, severity of, and response to the crises that
surface. Public debate will once again shape new legislation, regulations, or
both to calm public fears and restore a sense of confidence in our markets. The
costs of this confidence can not be ignored. Large multi-national corporations
expect to spend over 35,000 hours complying with the internal control
requirements of SOX and expect audit fees to increase 38%.67 This multimillion dollar burden will negatively impact the bottom lines of these
companies. But the cost to our economy from a loss of confidence in our
markets can not be underestimated. The cost to our public companies from a
loss of our capital markets could easily dwarf such preventive expenditures.
There is an important relationship between open markets and regulation
that our business and legislative leaders must carefully monitor and make
adjustments to address pending threats. Aggressive legislation and prosecution
by each of the states could tilt that relationship into over-regulation. There is a
temptation for states to jump on the Sarbanes-Oxley bandwagon without regard
to what other states are doing. Both California and New York have passed
additional documentation requirements above what is required by SOX. 68 With
every state passing rules, the complexity of corporate compliance multiplies
with the potential that a company has met the letter and spirit of the SOX
67See Fonda, supra note 55.
68Harvey Coustan, Linda M. Leinicke, W. Max Rexroad, Joyce A. Ostrosky, Sarbanes-Oxley: What

It Means to the Marketplace,J. ACcT., Feb. 2004, at 46.
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legislation, and that of all states except the one where they mistakenly have not
complied with an arcane state rule. Some attorney generals have further
suggested applying elements of SOX legislation to non-profit organizations.69
Even private companies are not immune from the spill-over effect of this and
related legislation as they will have to be in a position to comply fully with SOX
and state laws before they go public. 70 Even those that have no intention of
going public may need to comply with certain SOX practices to meet lender and
insurance requirements. 71 At some point, the burden of compliance will be too
much for our companies to bear.
XIII. CONCLUSION
New legislation and regulation are normally a governmental response
to issues or crises. We have shown that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was a response
to a wave of corporate fraud and the passivity of our nation's boards of directors
as well as audit, legal and analyst conflicts of interest and/or incompetence.
Under the supervision of the SEC, the NYSE and NASD have created new
listing standards and the PCAOB has initiated regulation of the accounting
profession. Some states even added another layer of public company regulation
and are considering rules for not-for-profit corporations. Even public companies
domiciled outside the United States must comply with SOX if their securities are
to trade in our public financial markets.
The need for this dramatic change, as costly as it is, was reinforced by
the long line of corporate frauds exposed over several months. But even the best
legislation can not predict the shape or scope of the next financial crises. Where
the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation responded to the bad behaviors of yesterday, it
will not prevent bad people from finding new ways to do bad things. The recent
mutual fund scandals adequately make this point. Unlike other scandals before
it, agents found new ways to reward themselves and favored clients at the
expense of those they were paid to represent. Mutual fund agents allowed
privileged clients to trade into their investment vehicles when it appeared, based
on late breaking news that such an investment would immediately increase in
value. Sometimes, the agents would trade for themselves. This activity diluted
the returns of those of us without privileged access who played by the rules.
What is clear is that the agents and gatekeepers must do all they can to
ferret out and address bad behavior before it has a chance to destroy a company.
Simply implementing new governance processes means nothing if there is not a
culture of transparency and openness and a willingness to take action against
those whose actions breach the moral and ethical boundaries expected of them,
regardless of their position or power. We, as shareholders, employees, and
69BoardSource, Independent Sector, The Sarbanes-OxleyAct and Implicationsfor Nonprofit
Organizations,at www.independentsector.org/PDFs/sarbanesoxley.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2004).
70Alan L. Goldberg, Sarbanes-Oxley reaches into private companies, S. FLA. Bus. J., Dec. 1, 2003.
71Paula Lacey Herman, Practicalimpact of Sarbanes-Oxleyon privately held companies,
HARTFORD BUS. J., Mar. 17, 2003.
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pensioners, must expect nothing less and speak in one voice to ensure that our
agents and gatekeepers do just that.
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